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Abstract
This study investigates the pro-poorness of income growth in Nigeria. Using nationally 
representative data for 1996 and 2004, overall income growth in Nigeria was found not to 
be pro-poor. The richer segments of the population appropriate greater share of beneﬁts from 
economic growth. Household size was a critical determinant of poverty levels.  Sector of 
employment also impacts on the probability of a household being poor; with those in agriculture 
being relatively worse off. The need for smaller family size has to be an integral part of policy 
aimed at poverty reduction in Nigeria. The support of the government in creating value in 
critical sectors (like agriculture and industry) that employ a large proportion of Nigerians 
in order to make growth pro-poor is critical. There is also a need for region-speciﬁc policies 
addressing the peculiarities of poverty in the different parts of the country. One size does not 
ﬁt all. Deliberate effort of the government in redistributing income is also required to ensure 
pro-poorness of growth in Nigeria.
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1. Introduction
  It is difﬁcult to discuss poverty in Nigeria and its causes without reference to the 
structural transformations that have occurred in the composition and performance of the 
components of gross domestic product (GDP) over time. At the inception of the oil mania 
following the end of the civil war in 1970, agriculture accounted for 47.6 percent of GDP. By 
1980, this share had reduced to only 30.8 percent and over the period, the share of petroleum 
rose from 7.1 percent to 22 percent. By 2001, oil accounted for 36.3 percent while the share 
of agriculture still stood 34.4 percent. Prior to then, the services sector had witnessed a 
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surge in growth, rising to as much as 40 percent of GDP in 1999 before declining back 
to about 30% in 2001. But the sub-sectors (including telecommunications and ﬁnancial 
services) that led the growth in services are not necessarily high employers of labour. There 
was also huge growth in informal services that provided substantial employment but lacked 
the capacity for signiﬁcant value addition. This structural transformation in turn mirrors the 
changing (often inconsistent, discontinuous, and poorly implemented) policy programmes 
that have been adopted by different governments over the years. Because Nigeria operates 
a three-tier system of governance comprising the federal, states and local governments, 
signiﬁcant geopolitical economic disparities can be partly traced to governance and 
institutional differences of component states. 
  While growth slowed down in the earliest periods, there has been some signiﬁcant 
rebound since 2000. Though ﬂuctuating, the per capita growth rate has remained decidedly 
positive since then, with aggregate growth averaging over 5 percent compared to 2.8 
percent estimated population growth rate. Poverty reduction has neither been consistent 
nor widespread relative to the growth numbers. Importantly too, growth is only pro-poor 
when the poor get a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of increases in output than the rich. It 
is not clear that this has been the case in Nigeria and indeed, the rate of poverty reduction 
has apparently not mirrored the rate of growth. Even though the two major household 
surveys used for this work were conducted between 1996 and 2004 and growth was not as 
signiﬁcant as it has been between 2004 and 2009, yet the little that occurred did not seem to 
have helped the poor so much. So it is possible policy programmes have not done enough 
to redistribute income in a manner that raises the welfare of the poor or at least mitigates 
the free-fall in welfare for the vulnerable group. 
  Nigeria has apparently not been fortunate with implementing poverty reduction 
programmes. At least in policy discussions, poverty reduction has been at the centre of 
the country’s economic policy and development programmes since independence. While it 
was not explicitly targeted in earlier development plans (1962 to 1975), it featured in more 
pronounced ways in latter programmes and projects, many of which speciﬁcally targeted 
elimination of poverty. These targeted programmes and projects covered a wide range of 
sectors including agriculture, health, education, housing and ﬁnance. In fact, they became 
so scattered that the Obasanjo regime (1999-2007) had to set out to rationalize and merge 
them in 1999. The various institutions that have arisen from the disparate poverty reduction 
programmes were then consolidated into the National Poverty Eradication Programme 
(NAPEP). This, headed by no less than the President himself, was charged with the sole 
mandate of eradicating poverty. 
  Empirical evidence and views are diverse as to the overall impact of these programmes. 
Some researchers (see for example Obadan, 1994; Faruquee, 1994; Canagarajah, et al., 
1997) believe that these programmes have impacted positively on the lives of the poor, 
while others such as Osinubi (2003) insist that they have not. Researchers in the latter 
group believe that overall growth in Nigeria is not necessarily pro-poor and that the poor 
are not beneﬁting from growth. Ironically, the Federal Government itself admits Nigeria 
is set to miss the MDG (FRN, 2005). This is despite the fact that there has been sustained 149 
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growth in income and income per capita over the past decade. Even though actual growth 
does not match MDG-required rates yet, there has been a substantial departure from the 
1990s where per capita growth was negative. But beyond relatively improved growth, the 
question as noted by the likes of Ravallion and Datt (1999), Eastwood and Lipton (2001) 
and Kakwani and Pernia (2000) is whether achieving this growth rate in itself is capable of 
meeting the challenges of poverty, hunger, poor health and inequality in Nigeria. It seems 
there are equally big challenges with the nature, content and direction of growth in the 
country. 
  There are also regional and sectoral dimensions to the growth and poverty challenge 
in Nigeria. The regional distribution of gains from growth has also been anything but 
equitable. Poverty has worsened in some parts of Nigeria while it improved in others. 
While some southern states witnessed signiﬁcant reduction in poverty between 1996 and 
2004, the majority of states in the north remained largely unaffected. It seemed that by 
2004, some segments of the country got disproportionately better-off than they were in 
1996 while others got worse-off. But Nigeria is a federation where not only the policies 
of the central government, but also those of the state and local governments, inﬂuence 
growth and poverty reduction. Sometimes policies at lower levels of governance are far 
more important than those at the national level primarily because they are close to the 
people. The cocoa and palm plantations and the groundnut pyramids have disappeared in 
favour of oil. But oil employs only about 2 percent of the workforce. The rest are engaged 
in other economic activities. Regional distribution of employment in the different sectors 
also differs signiﬁcantly. As yet, it is not known to what extent these replacement sectors 
and economic activities have helped the cause of growth, poverty reduction and equitable 
income distribution? And to what extent they could account for the differences in regional 
growth and poverty performances. For example, it is not clear that the stagnancy in the 
labour intensive but largely rudimentary agricultural sector has been accompanied by 
increasing share of other labour intensive modern sectors. 
  There is a clear need to evaluate the trajectory of the growth process over time in 
objective terms using standardized methodologies to assess the degree of pro-poorness of 
its distribution. It is important to hold up Nigeria’s growth trends to formal tests of pro-
poorness using standard measures in the literature. That, in part, is what this work intends 
to do. If growth in itself indeed cannot translate into improved standards of living of the 
poor and marginalized, what other margins of policy can be explored to reduce poverty and 
how? There has hardly been much assessment of the pro-poorness of growth in the country 
and the implications of the ﬁndings to underscore policy design. Meanwhile, though growth 
has rebounded, unemployment is still high (and in fact not even properly estimated because 
of existing policy programmes with temporary employment leading to individuals living 
on less than the minimum wage). So it becomes important to properly link growth with 
poverty reduction programmes, disaggregate sources of growth and poverty and measure 
the pro-poorness of growth as input into sustainable poverty reduction programmes. 
  This paper intends to decompose income growth and identify the contribution of 
different sectors of employment to the incidence of poverty. It intends to investigate the 150 
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kind of economic activities that are associated with decreases in poverty at the household 
and regional levels. More speciﬁcally, with an estimated 5 to 10 percent new entrants into 
the labour market getting a job, and unemployment for the 15 to 29 age group estimated at 
up to 60 percent, it is important to ask whether witnessed growth in the country has been 
pro-poor, sufﬁcient, and in the ‘right’ sectors? To what extent has the nature and sectoral 
composition of growth been responsible, not only for widespread unemployment but 
also for differences in regional poverty experiences? Are regional differences in poverty 
exacerbated by sectoral dynamics or just by demographics? Again, to what extent do these 
sectoral and regional employment challenges exacerbate regional poverty?
  This paper therefore aims to explore pattern and linkages of economic growth and 
poverty in Nigeria from an analytical standpoint that combines econometric estimates of 
determination of poverty in the regions. It aims to determine pro-poorness of economic 
growth in Nigeria from 1996 to 2004 using various methods and assess how sector of 
employment and household demographics impact on poverty in the different regions.
2.  Brief Literature Review
2.1   Trickle-Down Versus Pro-Poor Growth Strategies
  The idea that the beneﬁts of economic growth get to the poor indirectly through 
the spending of the rich as economic growth ﬁrst beneﬁts the rich and those with initial 
capacity was part of the inherited economic development thought from the 1950s and 
1960s. The trickle-down theory and the consequent ‘indirect beneﬁt’ approach to economic 
thought and policy received a big boost with the highly inﬂuential Dollar and Kraay (2000) 
study that ﬁnds that income of the poor rises one-to-one with overall growth. But these 
ﬁndings have also been highly contested by researchers including Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000) that produced counter evidence showing that there could also be ‘immiserizing 
growth’ (Bhagwati, 1988). And thus the need for deliberate pro-poor growth and poverty 
intervention policies that do not leave distribution to market forces as suggested by the 
trickledown theory. Poverty reduction is then seen as the fundamental objective of and 
a metric for assessing the effectiveness of development. Poverty reduction interventions 
employed alongside economic growth become therefore inﬂuential tool in combating 
income poverty (Essama-Nssah and Lambert, 2006).
  Pro-poor growth strategies are diverse and depend critically on the structure of the 
economy in consideration and the distribution of income among the different sectors that 
employ the relatively poor and the wealthy. In Africa for example, where the bulk of the 
poor live in the rural areas and incomes are tied to agricultural production, different authors 
have argued that an increase in the productivity and growth in the sector is likely to have 
signiﬁcant impacts on poverty reduction. They support such assertion by references to 
China and Bangladesh where growth in the primary sectors had greater impact on poverty 
reduction (Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Ricardo, 2005). Countries like Indonesia, Bangladesh 
and Vietnam have shown that increasing access to markets directly or indirectly through the 151 
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creation of labour intensive projects that create jobs for the poor is a viable pro-poor growth 
policy (see Ricardo, 2005). Other policies that have been identiﬁed as a viable option for 
pro-poor growth especially for agrarian communities include proper property rights and 
effective risk management (see Ricardo, 2005).
2.2  Some Empirical Studies on Growth and Poverty Reduction
  Following the understanding that poverty reduction can be triggered or managed, 
a number of studies have proceeded to evaluate both the approaches and instruments for 
doing this. A huge genre of literature has evolved to either strengthen the theory using 
further empirical data or show different sizes and composition of alternative methodologies 
for weighing in on poverty reduction (see for example, Son (2004) for applications to 
Thailand). Ravallion and Chen (2003) applying the measure of pro-poor growth as the 
mean growth rate for the poor on dataset from China explored China’s growth process 
in the 1990s. Over the years 1990-1999, they observed that the ordinary growth rate of 
household income per capita was 6.2% per annum and the growth rate by quintile ranged 
from 3% (poorest percentile) to 10% (richest percentile) and the rate of pro-poor growth 
was around 4%. They also observed that this trend was reversed in the mid-1990s for a few 
years. 
  The sort of analyses presented in some of these studies ostensibly help structure 
policy intervention in a manner that will ameliorate (if not correct) discrepancies in beneﬁts 
from growth. However, such studies have generally not been available for African countries 
including Nigeria. For example, there have not been studies conducted that tests for the 
convergence of the various methodologies proposed to test for the pro-poorness of growth 
in countries. In Nigeria speciﬁcally, there is dearth of studies in the area of pro-poor growth 
especially as it relates to income distribution and sectoral allocation of such growths from a 
micro-macro analytical perspective. This study is a preliminary step towards helping to ﬁll 
this huge knowledge gap. 
3.  Poverty, Growth and Economic Policy in Nigeria
  The challenge of poverty in Nigeria was aptly captured by the World Bank in a 1996 
publication on Nigeria titled: Poverty in the midst of plenty: The challenge of growth with 
inclusion. Even ofﬁcial reports from government, regularly accused by the civil society of 
exaggerating growth and underreporting poverty and unemployment, still indicate rising 
poverty over the last three decades since 1980. The National Bureau of Statistics ﬁgures 
indicate that national poverty incidence reduced from approximately 65.6 percent to about 
54.4 percent between 1996 and 2004. However, with increases in absolute population from 
an estimated 115 million to 140 million between the two periods, this actually amounts to 
an increase in the population in absolute poverty from 75.4 million to 76.2 million between 
the two periods. So a fall in relative poverty numbers may not mean a fall in the total 
population of the poor. There may be arguments about the relative size and composition of 152 
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the poor, but there is no argument about poverty as a critical fact in Nigeria. And there is no 
question it has trended up for many years. Income poverty moved up from 28.1 percent in 
1980 to 65.6 percent in 1996 before it returned to 54.4 percent in 2004. Even at that, self-
assessed poverty was 75.5 percent in 2004 (FOS, 2004). 
  Inequality has also been on the increase. Nigeria’s overall Gini coefﬁcient rose from 
0.387 in 1985 to 0.465 in 1996. By 2004, this has further increased to 0.515 and rose even 
further to 0.58 in 2007. So here is a society where poverty has increased, but then, inequality 
has increased even much more over time. This rising Gini coefﬁcient is not only a matter 
for urban areas, where there is always the tendency for it to be very high. In fact, Nigeria’s 
case is unique relative to many developing countries; its rural inequality coefﬁcient of 
0.581 is higher than its urban inequality, with coefﬁcient of 0.528 (Canagarajah et al, 1997; 
Canagarajah and Thomas, 2001; Aigbokhan, 1999; World Bank, 2003; and Oyekale et al, 
2007). 
  Following independence in 1960, the country aggressively pursued growth by 
promoting agriculture in the geopolitical regions. Regional agriculture was then the pivot of 
economic growth as each of the then four regions exploited its comparative advantage, the 
north in groundnut, the south east in palm produce and the south west in cocoa. The massive 
growth of the ﬁrst six years after independence was interrupted by the three year civil war 
that began in 1967 and ended in 1970. By 1970, oil export began a steady rise and soon 
became the mainstay of the economy. The splintering of the regions into component states 
also led to a weakening of the government base and support for the regional agricultural 
products. Growth in the 1970s was therefore primarily driven by oil exports. 
  The oil boom of the 1970s had decidedly real effects on growth; there were signiﬁcant 
increases in real GDP in both aggregate and per capita terms throughout the decade. As at 
1980, per capita income of the country had risen to US$1215. Then the oil glut of 1979/1980 
appeared which led to sharp drop in growth rate post-1979. By year 2000, per capita GDP 
was only US$706, a 42 percent fall in PPP terms from its 1980 value. The 2004 National 
Living Standards Survey (NLSS) indicates that about 20 percent of the population are in 
the core poor group while another 38 percent are moderately poor. 
  However, aggregate poverty statistics mask the huge spatial disparities that exist 
across urban – rural divide and the six geopolitical zones of the country. Figure 1 above 
shows that poverty is more concentrated in the rural than in the urban areas. Rural poverty 
is consistently higher than national average. But the greater challenge is the huge regional 
discrepancies in poverty especially in terms of broad categories of north and south. Poverty 
is relatively more concentrated in the northern parts of the country. In 1996, only 4 out of 
23 states with poverty levels over 60 percent are in the south, while the remaining 19 states 
representing 83 percent are in the north. 
  Not only is poverty more pervasive in the northern region, it is also more persistent. 
Little positive changes occurred in the region between the 1996 and 2004 surveys; in fact, 
the region fared worse on the aggregate in 2004 compared to its poverty position in 1996. 
The bulk of poverty reduction that occurred between 1996 and 2004 came from the south. 
Figure 2 shows poverty incidence in the six geopolitical regions based on the 1996 and 153 
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2004 living standards surveys. The ﬁrst three sets of columns shows the northern region – 
north-west, north east and north central respectively while the last three shows the southern 
region – south west, south east and south south. Poverty incidence fell only by 1 percentage 
point (from 77.2 to 71.2) in the northwest through the more than one decade between 
1994 and 2006. It increased in the north east and north central respectively from 70.1 
percent to 72.2 percent and from 64.7 percent to 67 percent. In contrast, the southwest had 
nearly 18 percentage point reduction in the proportion of the population in poverty (from 
60 percent down to 42 percent). The proportion in the southeast in poverty was reduced 
by nearly 27 percent (from 53 percent to 26 percent) while the proportion in poverty in 
the south-south dropped by 23 percent (from 58 percent to 25 percent). It is possible this 
development aggravated regional and spatial inequality making Nigeria one of the most 
unequal countries in the world. Interestingly, disparities in concentration of poverty among 
the regions reﬂect in disparities in economic, social and infrastructural developments. The 
UNDP (1994), for example, found that life expectancy in Edo and Delta States in the south-
south was 18 years higher than in Borno state in the northeast, the latter being among the 
lowest in the world. Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 2004 showed that child 
mortality in northwest is more than two and half times the rate in the southeast. Similarly, a 
recent World Bank study showed that rural poverty in Jigawa state (northwest) is four and 
half times the rate in Oyo state (southwest). 
Figure 1: Trends in Income Poverty, 1980 – 2004
       Source: Original data from the NLSS 2004154 
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Figure 2: Poverty Incidence by Regions in Nigeria
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  The spatial poverty situation in Nigeria is complex and does not lend itself to easy 
explanations. However, it is on record that colonial patterns of settlement and activities of 
early missionaries gave the southern geopolitical zones a head-start in the development 
of education, health and social infrastructure (Ityavyar, 1987). But such explanation does 
not sufﬁce for the persistence of this situation nearly one hundred years later. It has been 
suggested by some authors that cultural and other differences between the north and the 
south largely account for the differences in poverty incidence. While these may be true, it 
is also important to note the role oil rents could have played over time. Economic volatility 
arising from weak institutions may have been accentuated by rent from oil. In fact, the 
abolition of the groundnut pyramids and reliance on the less employment-generating oil 
sector may have affected the north more than other parts of the country. It is also possible 
that sectoral distribution of gains from increases in income could have been skewed against 
the sectors engaging the larger proportion of the workforce in the northern parts of the 
country. In this case, there are both income and substitution effects from the shift away 
from core agriculture to oil as a major source of revenue to government. Oil has been a 
critical contributor to the instability that has characterized Nigeria’s political economy. 
Oil revenue has over time become a source of entrenched rent-seeking that undermined 
productive effort giving rise to what has been appropriately described as prebendalism, a 
state of intensive struggle for the control of resources by fractious power blocks (Joseph, 
1987). But the political volatility is only an epiphenomenon of the greater volatility that 
characterizes the international oil market with its frequent booms and bursts. But it might 
be difﬁcult to make clear statements on these without examining sectoral contributions to 
poverty, which is integral to this paper. 
  The universal weakness of a prebendalistic economy is the absence of strong 
institutional framework to organize productive efforts. Governance institutions are 
compromised and accountability and transparency are undermined. The cost of doing 155 
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business increases and investment and economic growth are sacriﬁced, increasing poverty. 
While exact estimates do not exist, there are indications that poverty and inequality in 
Nigeria owe largely to the historical impacts of rents from oil. While oil accounts for 
over 90 percent of exports and 80 percent of government revenue, it employs only about 
2 percent of the workforce. But oil could equally have accentuated poverty through its 
impact on institution building. Rents from oil do not trickle down to the poor when they are 
not invested in productive efforts that will create jobs but rather invested in securing the 
sources of the rents and increasing access to the privileged few. Under such circumstances, 
economic growth can be consistent with increasing poverty. 
  In the Nigerian case, agriculture was largely abandoned and incentives were pitched 
against the productive sectors. Poor infrastructural development, little attention to research 
and poor industrial development strategy gave rise to still-born manufacturing sector. 
Lack of investment in rural infrastructure acted as a disincentive to rural agricultural life 
and a pull factor to the cities, giving rise to one of the highest urbanization rates in the 
world. With huge pressure mounting on the largely unplanned and under-developed urban 
infrastructure, the result was the emergence of sub-urban ghettos. But there are other ways 
in which oil hurt the poor in Nigeria. Inﬂux of petrodollars led to Dutch disease, exchange 
rate overvaluation and import dependence. With almost no mechanism for support, the 
poor bear a disproportionate share of these disincentives. Volatility in growth of the oil 
sector also meant huge swings in real income of the poor. Besides, quality of government 
expenditure decides overall impact of oil rents on the poor. These are midwived through 
existing institutions – and for all the efforts put into building them, these institutions have 
not been facilitative of poverty reduction in Nigeria. 
  The government has seemingly never left off ﬁghting poverty in the country. 
Several programmes aimed at reducing poverty have been initiated and implemented since 
independence. Even military governments advertised poverty reduction as their major goal 
and were not left out in the struggle to reduce poverty. This gave rise to a plethora of 
programmes over time. While the development planning era targeted broad economic growth 
on the understanding that they would yield poverty reduction, subsequent governments 
were more direct in line with the shift in global paradigm to explicit poverty reduction 
targets. Most of these were through deﬁned programmes giving rise to sharp increase 
in the number of institutions and projects aimed at poverty reduction. The Babangida 
administration (1985-1993) for example established the Peoples’ Bank, community banks, 
small scale credit schemes, National Directorate of Employment (NDE), the Family Support 
Programme (FSP), Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) among 
a host of others. The Abacha administration (1993-1998) established the Family Economic 
Advancement Programme (FEAP) and the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF). Most of these 
programmes were housed directly under the Presidency to depict the extent of relevance 
and support they received from the administration of the day. The poverty reduction 
strategy process initiated by the World Bank was equally housed under the Presidency. 
But by the ﬁrst term of his administration, Obasanjo decided to rationalize institutions 
tackling poverty and set up the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) as the 156 
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coordinating body for poverty reduction. The administration also introduced the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) alongside its States and 
Local Government counterparts (SEEDS and LEEDS) all of which ran as encompassing 
national reform programmes (Osinubi, 2003; FRN, 2005). Even specialized institutions of 
government like the Central Bank of Nigeria set up programmes like the Small and Medium 
scale Investment Equity Insurance Scheme (SMIEIS) in pursuit of poverty reduction. 
4.  Methodology and Analytical Framework
4.1   Study Population and Data
  Nigeria occupies approximately 923,768 square kilometres of land mass and is 
politically divided into 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. For operational 
convenience, the country is divided into six geo-political zones – north east, north-west, 
north central, south east, south west and south south. With a population of over 140 million, 
over 50 percent of which live in the rural areas and lack basic amenities (FRN, 2005), it is 
the most populous and second largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa 
  The 1996 General Household Survey (GHS) and the 2003/04 National Living Standard 
Survey (NLSS) datasets were used in the study. These are nationally representative datasets 
covering the 36 states of the Federation including the Federal Capital Territory. Both surveys 
used the National Integrated Survey of Households (NISH) frame and employed multi-stage 
sampling with data on living standards. The GHS contained information on about 22,000 
households while the NLSS contained information on about 1900 households. To ensure 
uniformity in assessing ‘pro-poor growth’, income was proxied by real expenditure values 
(in 2004 prices) based on the consumer price indices (CPIs) available from the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Unlike the GHS, the NLSS contains disaggregated expenditure 
items. To compare with the GHS a similar measure of expenditure was constructed for the 
NLSS by summing up the various components that comprise a category of expenditure. In 
part, this is mainly for the segment of the work concerned with assessing pro-poorness of 
growth. For the sectoral and regional analyses involving estimation of relationships, the 
major data were the 2004 NLSS. Most of the quantitative assessments in the work were 
handled with STATA 11 and SPSS 16. The analytical techniques for evaluating the different 
measures of pro-poor growth and unemployment and their implications for the Nigerian 
economy are contained below.
4.2  Measuring Pro-Poor Growth
  To determine pro-poorness of economic growth from 1996 to 2004, we adopt various 
approaches including Ravallion and Chen’s (2003) approach, Son’s (2004) approach, 
Kakwani and Pernia’s (2000) approach and Kakwani et al.’s (2004) methodology. We then 
compare the conclusions from these methodologies to assess the convergence of conclusion 
on the pro-poorness of growth in Nigeria over the two sample periods.157 
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  Modifying Kakwani (1993), Ricardo (2005) shows that the relationship between 
poverty, inequality and growth can be simply expressed as:
  (,) Pp y I   (1)
where (1) is the level of poverty.  y  is the level of income and I  is a measure of inequality
Changes in poverty following the total change representation can be written as
  ( *, *) ( *, *) py I py I y
dP dy dI
yI I


 
 (2)
Rearranging and simplifying, we obtain 
  %% ( / ) ( 1 / ) yI Pg I y Ip         (3)
where:  y   = elasticity of poverty to income,  g  = income growth rate,  I   = elasticity of 
poverty to inequality, % I   = percentage change in inequality, and  / yI   = correlation 
between inequality and growth.
  Equation (3) represents the percentage change in poverty which shows that changes 
in poverty is a function of changes in inequality, economic growth and the correlation 
between income disparities and growth rates. This clearly shows that poverty changes 
when any of its constituent units as found in (3) changes.
  The poverty incidence curve analysis of Ravallion and Chen (2003) asserts that a 
measure of pro-poor growth should satisfy the following axioms:
(i) The measure should be consistent with the direction of change in poverty, in that a 
positive (negative) rate of pro-poor growth implies a reduction (increase) in poverty.
(ii) The measure of poverty implicit in the measure of pro-poor growth should satisfy the 
standard axioms for poverty measurement
  The measure of pro-poor growth proposed is the actual growth rate multiplied by the 
ratio of the actual change in the Watts index to the change that would have been observed 
with the same growth rate but no change in inequality.
 A  modiﬁed Watts Index can be written in terms of the quintiles function as: 
 
0 log[ / ( )]
t H
tt Wz y p d p     (4)
where  () t yp  is the income of the  pth quintile at time t,  t H  is the headcount measure of 
poverty at time t,  z  is the poverty line.
  After differentiating (4) with respect to time, we obtain:
 
0
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  Dividing (5) by  t H  gives the measure of pro-poor growth which is measured by the 
mean growth rate for the poor given by:
 
0
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  Son’s (2004) methodology distinguished Growth Poverty Curve from the growth 
incidence curve used by Ravallion and Cheng (2003). Following Son (2004), we deﬁne 
() Lp as the Lorenz curve which describes the percentage share of income (or expenditure) 
enjoyed by the bottom  p  percent of the population which we may deﬁne as: 
 
0
1
() ()
x
Lp y fyd y

   (7)
where 
0 ()
x
pf y d y   and   is the mean income of the population and y is a person’s 
income with the probability density  () fy.
  For all poverty indices, Son (2004) showed that growth is unambiguously pro-poor 
when the Lorenz curve shifts upward i.e.  () 0 Lp   for all p.
  Reformulating the Lorenz curve as  ()
pp
Lp


  and by logarithmic transformation, 
Son (2004) obtained:
  () (( ) ) ( ) p Ln Ln L p Ln p    (8)
  Obtaining a growth form through ﬁrst difference, we arrive at 
  () ( () ) gp L n Lp    (9)
where:  () ( ) p gp L n   is the referred to as the growth rate of the mean income of the 
bottom  p  percent of the population ranking individuals according to their per capita 
income.  () gp which changes according to the changing values of 0 100 p   may be 
called the poverty growth curve.
  From (9), if  () gp g   for all  100 p  , growth is pro-poor and it is not pro-poor, 
if otherwise. Here,  g  is deﬁned as the overall growth rate. If however, 0( ) gp g   for 
all  100 p  , then growth reduces poverty but is accompanied with increasing inequality 
(trickle-down growth) where the poor receive proportionally less beneﬁts than the non-poor. 
If  () 0 gp  and  0 g   for all  100 p  , it implies that overall growth increases poverty and 
inequality.
  Kakwani and Pernia (2000) method basically aims to decompose total change 
in poverty into the pure growth effect (i.e. the percentage change in poverty when the 
distribution of income does not change) -  g O  and the inequality effect (i.e. the change 
in poverty when inequality changes in the absence of growth) -  I O .  g O  is a non-positive 
quantity because positive growth reduces poverty while  I O  could either be positive or 
negative depending on whether growth increases or reduces inequality respectively. Pro-
poor growth can then be measured as:
  / g     (10)
where   is the pro-poor growth index (PPGI), and  / g   is the ratio of poverty elasticities. 
Growth is pro-poor when  1   . It leads to an increase in poverty when  0    and when 
01    it reduces poverty but redistributes income in favour of the rich.
  Kakwani et al.’s (2004) model is built on Kakwani and Pernia’s (2000) framework 159 
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to address the monotonicity axiom (i.e. the magnitude of poverty reduction should be a 
monotonically increasing function of the pro-poor growth rate) and to satisfy a necessary 
and sufﬁcient condition for poverty reduction. They note that ‘while the PPGI captures the 
distribution of growth beneﬁts among the poor and non-poor, it does not take into account 
the level of the actual growth rate’ (p. 6). Kakwani et al. (2004) proposed the poverty 
equivalent growth rate (PEGR) represented as:
  (/)     
   (11)
where  /     is the same as that in (10) and   is the current growth rate in income. 
 is 
the growth rate that would yield the same level of poverty reduction as the current growth 
rate    if there is no change in inequality accompanying the growth process. Growth is 
pro-poor (pro-rich) when 
   (
  ). When 0 
   growth is accompanied by an 
increasing inequality and poverty is reducing. 
4.3  Assessing impact of sector of employment and region of origin on poverty 
incidence
  Using a Probit model we assess the impact of several variables on poverty across 
the six geo-political zones. The primary data employed here is the 2003/2004 NLSS. In 
preparing the NLSS, the National Bureau of Statistics classiﬁed households as poor or 
non-poor using standard Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) method. The nominal poverty line 
is NGN22, 928.00 (Twenty two thousand, nine hundred and twenty eight Naira) only. If 
a household is non-poor this dichotomous dependent variable takes the value of 1 and if 
poor it takes the value of 0. The explanatory variables are therefore the determinants of the 
probability that a given household is poor or non-poor. The coefﬁcients are interpreted in 
terms of the signs (i.e. positive or negative) and not necessarily in relative sizes. A positive 
sign will indicate that a particular explanatory variable increases the probability of being 
non-poor while a negative sign increases the probability of being poor. 
  Sectors of employment, sex, location and academic qualiﬁcations are the major 
explanatory variables and each is deﬁned in line with NBS classiﬁcation from the surveys. 
The trade and sales sector are used as control for employment, females as benchmark 
variable for sex, rural area as benchmark variable for location and those with tertiary 
education as benchmark for academic qualiﬁcations. Trade is selected as benchmark group 
for employment because of the higher growth of the sector relative to the rest of the sectors 
between 1996 and 2009. Rural areas and females are usually considered disadvantaged 
in poverty analysis; so we respectively benchmark urban and male to these. Those with 
tertiary education, on the other hand, are generally considered relatively well-off and 
studies indicate in terms of assets and income, they are usually better off than those with 
other academic qualiﬁcations. So the group will be used as benchmark for poverty among 
education groups. For each group, we estimate poverty incidence in the other groups 
relative to the benchmark groups.
  There are presently no recent data based on national surveys reﬂecting household 160 
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demographics, sectoral and/or occupational or education in the country. However, a recent 
World Bank (2010) survey of 2250 households indicates national average household size 
to be about 6 persons per household. There are however, regional differences. Average 
household size for families in the north at over 7 persons is relatively higher than that for 
families in the south at about 5 persons. Household sizes also differ between urban and rural 
households, with rural families generally having larger household sizes. To what extent this 
drives poverty or is itself a function of the varying poverty levels in each region and location 
is not known, the former being the object of this research. Following the collapse of the 
clearly demarcated regional agricultural systems, agricultural employment diminished in 
most of the south. But the north has remained predominantly engaged in agriculture. This 
could partly be attributed to resource endowment, which in turn also affects willingness 
to migrate and take up alternative jobs from a people’s immediate location (Komolafe, 
2002). For example, whereas the entire northern region has large landmass and beneﬁts 
from irrigation programmes, the south east is much less endowed. This partly accounts for 
the high migration from the region and less attention to agriculture. Therefore, agriculture-
employment-induced poverty might affect the north much more than it would affect the 
south east. 
  Impact of education on poverty comes in several forms. Higher level of education 
is associated with enhanced capacity for mobility which implies better ability to take 
up opportunities elsewhere when the immediate environment does not present full 
opportunities. Docquier and Marfuok (2006) analysis of international migration by 
educational attainment classically demonstrates how this works. In Nigeria, as in many 
other places, available evidence indicates that the less educated are also less mobile and so 
have limited opportunities for improving their income beyond their immediate environment. 
Currently, educational attainment varies widely by regions as well. In fact, national average 
literacy rates sometimes disguise the wide regional differences. Primary school enrolment 
in some northern states is as low as 45 percent and as high as 95 percent in some southern 
states. The religious and cultural attitudes of each people towards western education play 
signiﬁcant part in this. People in urban areas also generally have greater access to a wider 
range of educational services than those in rural areas. So literacy rate in urban areas is 
generally higher than it is in rural areas.
  The NLSS and other surveys in the country capture the range of incomes of 
respondents. It is easy therefore to model the determinants of income among respondents 
in the surveys. Though modelling directly on income could reveal relative poverty 
(World Bank, 2005), we however model determinants of poverty in a dichotomous choice 
framework as we are particularly interested in absolute poverty and the distinction between 
the poor and the non-poor. In addition, it is not clear that an analysis of the determinants of 
income may yield results different from that regularly conducted on income determination 
at the broader macro level and which has already received much attention.161 
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5. Findings
 
5.1  Has Growth in Nigeria been Pro-Poor?
  In Figure 3, the poverty growth curve based on the framework of Son (2004) is 
presented. The horizontal line denotes the average overall growth rate (i.e.  g ). It is 
important to note that the result based on this framework does not rely on the speciﬁcation 
of any poverty line. Based on the chart, if the growth rate at the bottom p percentile is 
greater than the overall growth rate (i.e.  () gp g   for all  100 p  ), growth within the 
period 1996-2004 is pro-poor. However, the poverty growth curve shows that up until the 
poorest 80 per cent of the population, growth is not pro-poor. This is because  () gp g   for 
80 p  . However, the upward sloping nature of the curve implies that generally, there are 
improvements as you move up the ladder but such improvements do not imply pro-poor 
growth for the poorest segments of Nigerians. 
Figure 3: Poverty growth curve (1996-2004)
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 Speciﬁcally, Figure 3 shows that  () 0 gp  for all  100% p  . This implies that growth 
reduces poverty (across all percentiles) but is accompanied with increasing inequality 
(trickle-down growth) where the poor receive proportionally less beneﬁts than the non-
poor from the process of growth. These show that even though national poverty statistics 
indicate a decline of poverty headcount from about 66% (1996) to 54% (2004), and an 
increment in growth over the same period, the dividends from growth is disproportionately 
beneﬁting the rich than the poor. This works through the inequality linkage. 
  Similar to the poverty growth curves, we present in Figure 4 relative pro-poor curves 
(see Abdelkrim and Duclos, 2007). The results are similar to the poverty growth curves. At 
all percentiles below 70 percent, the curve lies below the horizontal line (zero). The curve 
is only above the horizontal line at the top percentiles. These ﬁgures also show that while 162 
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growth has been positive between the periods (1996-2004), it is beneﬁting the rich more 
than it does to the poor because of the increasing inequality in incomes.
Figure 4: Relative pro-poor growth curves (Dual approach)
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  While the curves presented are informative, they do not provide an ‘index’ to assess 
overall pro-poorness of growth in Nigeria. In Table 1, we present results showing selected 
pro-poor growth indices using the FGT(α) (Foster et al., 1984) class indices. Speciﬁcally, 
poverty headcount (α = 0) was used as the measure of poverty (the Ravallion and Chen, 
2003 measure requires only the headcount measure). 
Table 1: Selected pro-poor indices (α = 0) 
Poverty line =2645; Parameter alpha = 0.00
Pro-poor Indices Estimate Standard error Lower bound Upper bound
Growth rate (g) 7.982741       0.346410 7.303790         8.661691
Ravallion & Chen (2003) Index 0.926187         0.016550         0.893750         0.958624
Ravallion and Chen (2003) - g 7.056554         0.342562        -7.727962        -6.385145
Kakwani & Pernia (2000) Index 0.778632         0.010212         0.758618         0.798647
PEGR Index 6.215619         0.283503         5.659963         6.771275
PEGR - g -1.767122                0.110670        -1.98403        -1.550213
  From the tables, the overall growth rate is 7.98% (with standard error of 0.35%). To 
assess the extent of pro-poorness, this is compared with the respective indices (except for 
the Kakwani and Pernia index). The Ravallion & Chen (2003) index of 0.93 implies that 
growth over the period 1996 – 2004 is not pro-poor. Speciﬁcally, this can be understood 
as a trickle-down growth because (0.93 < 7.98). The Kakwani et al. (2004) measure uses 163 
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the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR) (γ*). If γ* > g (i.e. the overall growth rate), 
then we have a pro-poor growth. If (0 < γ* < g), we have a trickle down growth; and if (γ* 
< 0), we have an immiserizing growth. As shown in the table, the PEGR is less than the 
actual growth rate (i.e. 6.22% < 7.98%). This implies a trickle-down growth which is not 
necessarily pro-poor in the strict sense. This is also consistent with the results of the Son 
(2004) growth poverty curve and that obtained using the Ravallion and Chen approach. For 
the Kakwani and Pernia index (φ), we have that 0 < φ < 1 which again conﬁrms a trickle 
down growth process between the period of 1996 – 2004.
  A comparison of all the methods used shows that there is some level of agreement in 
predicting the nature of growth in Nigeria between 1996 and 2004. Because these methods 
use different evaluative frameworks, we cannot compare the magnitudes of their indices. 
However, the overall picture is still illuminating. Even though there was remarkable growth 
experience over the period in Nigeria, it did not translate into a reduction in inequality. 
Though the growth process in Nigeria was able to reduce the magnitude of poverty to some 
extent, this did not translate to improvements in inequality. 
  In part, this may not have been very difﬁcult to understand.
5.2  Determinants of Poverty
5.2.1  Factors Affecting Poverty in the Regions 
Demographic Factors and Regional Poverty
  We provide an assessment of the determinants of poverty in the regions. The 
regression results in Table 2 show impact of selected demographic factors on incidence of 
poverty in the six regions. Explanatory factors include household size, age of the household 
head, location of the household (urban versus rural) and sex for all regions. 
Table 2: Selected Demographic Factors and Poverty Incidence in Regions
HH Size Age Group Location (Urban 
vs Rural Areas)
Sex (Male vs 
Female)
                   Coef                    z         Coef.                z        Coef.                z        Coef.                z       
South South -0.253** -20.72 -0.008 -0.67 0.413 5.41 -0.009 -0.13
South East -0.229** -18.03 0.071** 5.72 0.361 3.72 -0.021 -0.3
South West -0.229** -17.35 0.033** 3.07 0.168 2.59 0.023 0.32
North Central -0.139** -14.89 -0.019* -1.9 0.195 3.05 0.055 0.66
North East -0.210** -20.59 0.010 1.02 0.392 4.44 0.018 0.15
North West -0.144** -15.7 0.008 0.79 0.603 6.92 -0.366** -2.11
*,** signiﬁcant at 10% and 1% respectively
Source: Authors’ estimates164 
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  From the estimates, it can be seen that household size is quite critical in deﬁning 
poverty across all regions. This indicator remained consistently relevant across all 
estimations. From this result, it is plausible to relate differences in average household sizes 
in the different regions to differences in poverty incidence in each region. According to 
World Bank (2010) household survey it is clear that regions with very high household 
sizes are also the ones with very high incidences of poverty, conﬁrming that household 
size matters for poverty in Nigeria. Nearly 90 percent of households in the south west have 
maximum of 6 persons (the national average) while only about 1 percent are made up of 
11 persons or more (see Figure 5). By contrast, only 48 percent of households in the north 
have maximum of 6 persons in the household while as much as 20 percent of households in 
the region have 11 persons or more. It is not clear what drives differences in fertility across 
the regions. But some of the factors responsible may not be unconnected with levels of 
development, cultural practices and literacy levels, indicating circular causation between 
poverty and these factors (an issue that has been harped upon in the literature). 
Figure 5: Household Size by Regions
Source: WB 2010 (Note: North includes north-west, north east and north central)165 
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  Age group of the household head seems to be more critical for poverty in some 
regions than in others. It is very signiﬁcant for the south east and south west regions. 
Older households fair better than younger households in these two regions on the average 
(possibly on account of accumulation and inheritance). Age is also important for the north 
central region but negatively so. Older households are poorer. In other regions, it is not 
very important. Location also matters, and nearly evenly so, for all regions of the country. 
Urban areas are generally signiﬁcantly better off than the rural areas in all regions. But 
the impact of sex in the regions is worth observing. In the south south and south east, 
female headed households were marginally better off. But for regions like south west, north 
central and north east, male headed households are marginally better off. In the north-west, 
the difference is much more signiﬁcant – female headed households are much better off 
than male headed households. Again, this goes to the root of cultural practices. The male 
headed households in the homogenous north-west have more members (with many wives 
and children) than the female headed households. So whatever income that comes to the 
household has to be spread among members. These are besides other restrictive practices 
against women in the region. By contrast, female headed households do not have to carry 
the burdens of extra ‘husbands’ and numerous children. They are generally slimmer. 
5.2.2  Impact of Occupation on Poverty across Regions
  The regional equations using the benchmark group (sales and related activities) 
indicate that sector of employment is critical for poverty. Relative to the benchmark group, 
students, unemployed and retired persons are very negatively affected across all regions. 
However, the level of relative wellbeing for this group is worse in regions like the south 
east, south west and north-west than in other regions of the country. The margin is smaller 
in the south south and north east and smallest in the north central region. This may not be 
unconnected with the relative stock and welfare of this group in the two southern regions 
relative to the rest of the country. In fact, as can be seen from Table 3, more than in any 
other region, nearly all groups (except clerical and services) fare much worse than traders 
in the south east. This is partly because more than any other region, the south east has 
the highest proportion of persons in trade and related services. The south east is a major 
hub of trade (both wholesale and retail) in the country and many of those employed in it 
have signiﬁcantly higher income than the rest of the society. As such, it takes much larger 
earning power for an employee of any other occupation in the south east to be better off 
than a trader. Hosting prominent commercial centres like Lagos and Ibadan, the same goes 
for the south west to a lesser degree. 166 
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Table 3: Relative Poverty among Occupation Groups 
(Benchmark = Sales and Related)
South South South East South West North 
Central
North East North West
Coef.                 z    Coef.    z     Coef.                         z Coef.z         Coef.                                 z         Coef.                                 z    
Student, Retired, 
Unemployed
-0.18 -1.28 -0.57 -3.66 -0.23 -2.22 -0.05 -0.43 -0.312 -1.44 -0.71 -3.93
Professional or 
technical
-0.05 -0.33 -0.35 -1.94 -0.03 -0.24 0.08 0.65 0.22 1.26 0.02 0.1
Administration 0.11 0.16 -0.84 -0.88 -0.12 -0.29 0.60 1.65 0.76 1.11 -0.28 -0.3
Clerical -0.11 -0.85 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.18 -0.26 -1.95 0.05 0.29 -0.13 -0.84
Services and related -0.17 -1.26 0.02 0.08 -0.36 -2.77 0.04 0.27 0.11 0.55 -0.31 -1.77
agriculture and 
forestry
-0.16 -1.69 -0.60 -4.69 0.11 1.22 0.15 1.64 -0.45 -3.45 -0.76 -6.6
Production and 
transport
0.15 0.85 -0.28 -1.29 -0.09 -0.61 0.05 0.29 -0.39 -1.6 -0.03 -0.18
Manufacturing and 
Processing
0.05 0.26 -0.04 -0.15 -0.02 -0.12 -0.15 -0.72 0.74 1.47 0.18 0.56
Others -0.06 -0.38 0.05 0.25 -0.17 -1.51 -0.06 -0.35 -0.14 -0.61 -0.33 -1.55
Source: Authors’ estimates 
  Professionals and technicians do not fare the same across regions either. They are 
worse off in the entire southern region, and especially so in the south east. In the north, they 
fare better and this is not surprising. The wide array of employment groups in the south, 
including the booming trade, can comfortably compete with professionals and technicians. 
But in the north, the relatively fewer professionals would always fare better than the 
predominantly agricultural employees. Those employed in administration and clerical jobs 
do not fare much worse than those in trade. There are both positive and negative differences 
across regions, but these are mostly minor except in the north central. There are also no 
signiﬁcant regional differences in the welfare of those employed in administration and 
clerical jobs relative to those in trade. Relative poverty among employees in the services 
subsector is much higher in three geopolitical regions (south south, south west, and north-
west) and (marginally) lower in the other three. 
  Worsening relative poverty is deepest and most pervasive among agricultural 
employees – being most signiﬁcant and covering the widest range of regions. In fact, 
poverty among agricultural employees was signiﬁcantly worse in nearly all regions 
(except south west and north central). The south east, north east and north-west were the 
most heavily affected. In effect, the sector of employment most signiﬁcantly affected by 
rising poverty is agriculture – and this cuts across two-thirds of all regions in the country. 
Meanwhile, in nearly all regions, agriculture is the highest employer of labour. It is only 
in the south west and north central that agricultural employees seem to have managed 167 
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to hold favourable income relative to sales employees. It is worth noting that states in 
the north central region, particularly Benue and Kogi states, have retained their status 
as the food basket of the nation for a very long time. Taking into account the fact that 
agriculture employs more than half the labour force in the country, it is not difﬁcult to see 
why growth has not been pro-poor over the period under consideration. Whatever growth 
that fails to impact on agriculture would have left out more than half the entire labour force 
in the country. Where such growth is skewed against agriculture, as available data seem to 
indicate has been the case, it favours only a small proportion of the working population and 
the gains from it are very unevenly distributed among the population. Agriculture lost share 
in GDP signiﬁcantly between 1970 and 1997 before it marginally gained 2 percent of GDP 
between 1997 and 2009. All this while, it was not losing share in employment by nearly as 
much. The implication is that the sector continues to employ nearly the same proportion 
of persons, but these persons continued to lose income to other sectors. In fact, in absolute 
terms, factoring in the impact of rising population, total population engaged in agriculture 
has actually been increasing over time, yet there has been little improvement in either the 
size of total income that accrues to them or their share of total national income. When this is 
the experience of more than half the labour force, then neither rising poverty nor skewness 
in income distribution is difﬁcult to understand. 
  Relative poverty in the production and transport sector is also much higher than in 
sales group in four regions – the same number of regions as were affected in agriculture. 
The difference is that they are not nearly as deep (signiﬁcant) as the relative poverty in 
agriculture. The regions where relative income was negative was also nearly the same as 
those affecting agriculture except that in the place of south south, the south west completes 
the number. Relative poverty among this group was not as bad in the south south and north 
central. Manufacturing employees also fared relatively worse (marginally) in three of the 
six regions – the south east, south west and north central. Again, as in the production and 
transport group, the impact is not as deep as in agriculture. They seem also less pervasive. 
This group performed marginally better in the south south, north east and north-west, 
with the strongest relative welfare performance being in the north east. Again, this might 
indicate generally lower manufacturing intensity in the concerned regions than in the rest. 
For example, the proportion of manufacturing employees in the north east is relatively 
low compared to such regions as the south west and south east. The north east has some 
concentration of manufacturing, but relative to the overall population and size of the region, 
manufacturing penetration is still small. In effect, manufacturing employees are relatively 
very poor in the regions with the bulk of manufacturing concerns with the exception of the 
north-west. 
5.2.3  Education and Regional Poverty 
  The benchmark group for estimating impact of education across the regions 
consists of those with tertiary education. Results from the regressions show that relative 
to this benchmark group, virtually all other groups performed worse. This result remains 168 
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consistent across all regions and for all education qualiﬁcations as shown in Table 4. The 
only variations are in the level of signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient estimates in different 
groups in different regions. The results consistently indicate that across all regions, the 
most signiﬁcantly backward group consists of those without any education at all. The level 
of signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients for this group remained the highest and most consistent 
across all regions. Relative poverty (compared to the benchmark group) among the rest of 
the groups is also high. In very few cases, the coefﬁcients are less signiﬁcant than the rest as 
is the case among those with elementary education in the south west and north central and 
those with primary education in the north east. In effect, the impact of education on relative 
poverty in the country cuts across regions with only minor variations in coefﬁcient.
Table 4: Relative Poverty for Academic Qualiﬁcations– Benchmark = Tertiary 
Education 
South South       South East South West North Central North East North West
Level of 
Education
Coef.         z Coef.     z Coef.        z    Coef.     z Coef.            z Coef.           z
None -0.949 -6.68 -0.811 -4.27 -0.559 -4.87 -0.737 -7.2 -0.934 -5.6 -1.202 -6.76
Elementary -0.576 -1.83 -0.974 -3.54 -0.497 -1.41 -0.475 -1.58 -1.444 -3.14 -1.021 -3.55
Primary   -0.721 -4.53 -0.715 -3.58 -0.545 -3.05 -0.299 -1.89 -0.357 -1.57 -0.455 -1.81
Secondary -0.674 -5.22 -0.499 -2.76 -0.383 -3.77 -0.543 -5.52 -0.600 -3.58 -0.564 -3.17
Others        -0.319 -1.8 -0.688 -3.02 -0.182 -1.21 -0.254 -1.95 -0.740 -4.27 -0.915 -5.15
Source: Authors’ estimates
6. Conclusion
  This paper sets out to evaluate the pro-poorness of growth and factors that affect 
poverty in Nigeria. Pro-poor growth was analyzed using the 1996 General Household 
Survey and the 2004 National Living Standards Survey while analysis of determinants 
of poverty was with the 2004 NLSS only. All three methodologies used to assess the pro-
poorness of growth in the country are consistent in indicating that growth has not been pro-
poor. The study also found that poverty in the country is affected by both micro and macro 
variables. At the micro level, major demographic indices of the household like education, 
family size, sex, location of the household and age of the household head affect poverty 
signiﬁcantly. Some of these micro factors like education, household size, and location of 
the household fall into categories that can be affected by decisions of members of the 
family, but others like sex of the household head are not easily amenable to policy. Sex is 
a critical factor only in one region – the north-west and only marginally in the rest of the 
regions. But there are also macro variables that affect household poverty prominent among 
which is the sector of employment. The Nigerian economy has evolved and transformed 
over the last two decades and some sectors have grown while others shrank. It was found 
that those engaged in trade has been signiﬁcantly better off than employees in most other 169 
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segments of the economy. Agricultural employees have performed poorly alongside those 
in industry, manufacturing and other services. With the bulk of the labour force being in 
agriculture, it is then not surprising that overall growth has not been pro-poor. 
  So what could be done about poverty in Nigeria? It must be appreciated that one 
of the biggest challenges is a demographic transformation, particularly in the north where 
family sizes are relatively large. It is important that signiﬁcant resources be committed 
to enlightenment of the populace in these areas to the dangers of massive family sizes 
that stretch resources and make capital deepening and investment in the child extremely 
difﬁcult. Presently, this is interacting with the poor education factor to create unsustainable 
situations where children go into adulthood without any care or useful investment made 
in their lives, thus reducing their overall relevance to the economy. Such enlightenment 
programmes have to be the combined effort of government, the civil society (including 
traditional institutions) and development partners in the country. 
  But in addition, the challenge of rural development has continued to come to the 
fore. Agriculture, which has been the traditional employer in the rural areas, is not growing 
fast enough to catch up with the income need of those engaged in it. Agriculture continues 
to be predominantly rain-fed, with rudimentary technology that cannot even guarantee 
preservation of harvests up to the point of sales. As such, even when weather conditions are 
good enough to result in high yields, farmers could still incur signiﬁcant post-harvest losses. 
Infrastructure in much of the rural areas is anything but attractive. Frustration with these 
limitations accounts for the large rural-urban migration that continues even where there 
is sufﬁcient guarantee that life in the urban areas could be more difﬁcult for households. 
Interestingly, rural poverty and agricultural poverty challenges are interlinked and can be 
solved by marginally improving conditions in the agricultural sector and placing some 
safeguards against price and storage losses for farm outputs. 
  It is also necessary to pay attention to the regional distribution of factors of production, 
growth and employment. It has become imperative that policies put in place for dealing 
with poverty demonstrate understanding and therefore incorporate sectoral and regional 
diversities of growth, employment and poverty. In addition to the demand-driven measures 
consistently pursued by successive administration to tackle poverty, some attention needs 
to be paid to supply-side constraints that affect the poor more stringently than the rich 
across sectors and regions. Speciﬁcally, the role played by oil in sectoral employment 
and value added needs to be once again evaluated. The Nigerian economy need not be 
an oil economy that cripples productivity in other sectors as has been the case over the 
years. Minor improvements in policy attention to the real sector (especially agriculture and 
manufacturing) can yield huge differences in income for a large proportion of workers. 
Clearly, there is need for region-speciﬁc policies addressing the peculiarities of poverty 
in the different parts of the country. For example, decades of experiences shows the north 
would have done better depending on the groundnut pyramids of the 1960s than it has done 
depending on oil. It is therefore not enough to pursue one-size ﬁts all poverty reduction 
policies for the entire country. While it is not realistic to advocate a return to the pre-1970 
agricultural system, poverty policies have to identify supply-side sectors that can absorb the 170 
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teeming young population of the country and reduce poverty among them. Four decades of 
hand-outs and sharing of oil revenue have proved inadequate in handling the complicated 
poverty issues in these parts of the country. Clearly, the government cannot continue to 
ignore the uneven spatial distribution of factors of production as well as other differences 
in development indices between southern and northern Nigeria if it is to promote speedy 
growth. 
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